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Abstract This paper compares the waves of globalization before the outbreak of the
Great Recession in 2007 with its alleged historical antecedent before the outbreak of
World War One. We describe trends in trade and openness, investigate the proximate
causes of changes in openness and estimate the gains from trade from the early
nineteenth century onwards. Our results suggest that the conventional wisdom has to
be revised. The first wave of globalization started around 1820 and culminated around
1870. In the next century, trade continued to grow, with the exception of the Great
Depression, but openness and gains fluctuated widely. They resumed a clear upward
trend from the early 1970s. By 2007, the world was more open than a century earlier
and its inhabitants gained from trade substantially more than their ancestors did.
Keywords Globalization  Trade openness  Gains of trade  Nineteenth and
twentieth century
JEL Classification F14  N10
1 Introduction: why revisit globalization?
In 2007, world trade was about two times greater than in 1997, six times greater
than in 1972 and 32 times greater than in 1950. This was one of the most evident
features of the current wave of globalization, which is widely credited to have
fostered economic growth. But, as many scholars have pointed out, the world had
experienced a similar process, promptly christened the first globalization, in the
decades before World War One (Rodrik 1998; O’Rourke and Williamson 1999;
Bordo et al. 2003; Collier and Dollar 2002; Findlay and O’Rourke 2007). In those
years, trade rose fast, core countries experienced modern economic growth for the
first time in history and growth gradually spread to the periphery via trade. The
Great Trade Collapse (Baldwin 2009) and the subsequent stagnation, has suggested
less uplifting historical comparisons. The first globalization was arrested by the
outbreak of World War One, and, after a modest recovery in the 1920s, was
definitively killed by the protectionist reactions to the Great Depression (Eichen-
green 2015).
These historical comparisons are part and parcel of the scholarly discourse on the
current globalization. They implicitly focus on openness as the mean measure of
globalization, as it captures the additional increase of trade beyond the effect of
economic growth, and they explain its movements with changes in international
trade costs relative to domestic ones (Sect. 2). This literature is arguably flawed
(Sect. 3). First, it uses an imprecise measure of openness and does not exploit the
recent advances in trade theory. Second, with the notable exception of Hugot
(2014), authors ignore the period before 1870, which featured massive convergence
of prices within Europe (Jacks 2005; Federico 2011) and worldwide (Sharp and
Weisdorf 2013; Chilosi and Federico 2015), as well as an extensive liberalization of
trade (Federico 2012; Tena-Junguito et al. 2012). Third, the conventional wisdom
relies on very fragile quantitative evidence. Most estimates of openness refer to a
few advanced countries in Europe and the Western offshoots. The available series of
world trade, dating back to the 1960s and 1970s, neglect all estimates of trade by
country published since then and cover peripheral countries very crudely, if at all.
The recent wave in gravity models (Anderson and van Wincoop 2004; Head and
Mayer 2014; Meissner 2014) suffers from the same advanced country bias and, on
top of this, relies on data on bilateral flows, which are notoriously the least reliable
information in historical trade statistics (Federico and Tena-Junguito 1991).
This paper aims at putting these historical comparisons on a solid quantitative
ground. To this aim, we have estimated yearly series of trade for all polities since
1850, at the latest, to 1938 (Federico and Tena-Junguito 2016a) and we have
collected all the available data on historical national accounts for the same period
(Appendix C of Electronic Supplementary Material). Extending these series to
present with the data from the United Nations, in this paper we make four
contributions:
i. We sketch out the growth of world trade since 1800, focusing on the
comparison between the two globalizations (Sect. 4).
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ii. We describe trends in openness, defined as the ratio of exports to GDP at
current prices, from 1830 onwards (Sect. 5).
iii. We analyze the proximate causes of movements in world openness,
distinguishing changes in the distribution of world GDP, changes in the
composition of GDP by sector and a residual, which captures changes in
trade costs (Sect. 6).
iv. We compute the gains from trade using both the statistics by Arkolakis et al.
(2012) and the extended version by Felbermayr et al. (2015), and we discuss
their possible biases (Sect. 7).
Section 8 tests the robustness of our results to different sets of GDP data,
different measures of openness and alternative weighting systems of country series,
and Sect. 9 concludes.
2 Openness in historical perspective: a survey
The literature on trade in the last two centuries is huge (Findlay and O’Rourke 2007),
but there are comparatively few estimates of openness in the long-run. Feenstra (1998)
and Baldwin and Martin (1999) report ratios of total merchandise trade (imports plus
exports) to GDP for selected countries at benchmark years, while Maddison has
published two overlapping estimates for the ‘‘world’’ export/GDP ratio at constant
prices. The ratio soared from 1% in 1820 to 5% in 1870 (Maddison 1995, p. 38),
continued to rise, althoughmore slowly, to 7.9% in 1913 and to 9% in 1929 (Maddison
2001, Table F5). The twin shock of the Great Depression andWorldWar One reduced
the ratio to 5.5% in 1950, but the 1998 ratio (17.2%) was more than double its 1913
level. In a recent paper, Klasing and Millionis (2014) have published series of
openness for a large number of countries (up to 62 in some years) from 1870 to 1949,
which they obtain by dividing total trade from Barbieri et al. (2009), Barbieri and
Keshk (2012) by their own ‘synthetic’ series ofGDP at current prices (SeeAppendixC
of Electronic Supplementary Material). They sum up these country series to get a
series of world openness, which they extend to 2005with data from the Penn Tables. It
increases by a third until World War One, from less than 20 30% and then, after the
collapse of the 1930s, to about 40% in the late 1990s and 50% in 2005. Thus, they
conclude that the world was more open in the late 1990s than in 1913, but their
estimate of the gap is substantially smaller than Maddison’s.
As an alternative to direct measuring, one can infer the potential for globalization
from a measure of trade costs. First, one can compare the (time-invariant)
coefficients of distance in gravity equations for different periods of time
interpreting lower coefficients as evidence of lower transaction costs. Second, one
can estimate bilateral trade costs as
Tij ¼ Xii  Xjj
 
Xij  Xji
   1=2e ð1Þ
where e is the elasticity of trade to trade costs, X are trade flows, and subscripts refer
to international (Xij and Xji) or domestic (Xii and Xjj) trade flows (Head and Ries
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2001; Jacks et al. 2006). The resulting series can be weighted with country shares on
GDP or on trade to get indexes of world (or regional) trade costs.
Neither method confirms the conventional wisdom regarding the second
globalization. The careful survey by Disdier and Head (2008) shows that the
coefficients of gravity equations are not lower in the 1990s and early 2000s than in
the 1950s 1960s, and scholars have put forward several hypotheses to explain this
outcome (Carrere and Schiff 2005/2006; Hummels 2007; Berthelon and Freund
2008). The results of estimates of trade costs since 1870 by Jacks et al. (2011) and
since 1830 by Hugot (2014) with Eq. 1) are quite sensitive to the country coverage,
methods of computing domestic trade flows and of aggregating across countries. For
instance, Hugot (2014) finds a sharp decline in costs after 1950 for his full sample,
which almost disappears for time-invariant samples (compare his Figs. 5 and 6).
Costs in 2007 are much lower than 1913 for peripheral European countries and the
rest of the world, but similar for the USA and France and much greater for the
United Kingdom (Fig. 7). These estimates proxy domestic flows with the difference
between GDP and exports, but both Jacks et al. (2011, Fig. A4.b) and Hugot (2014,
Fig. 31) find a sizeable decline in costs after 1970 if domestic flows are computed as
the difference between gross output of tradables (agriculture and manufacturing)
and exports. In a more general vein, as Hillberry and Hummels (2014, point out,
Eq. 1) assumes that the allocation of trade between domestic and foreign flows, and
thus ultimately the allocation of consumption of tradables between domestic and
foreign producers, depends entirely on trade costs. This rules out any effect of
technological or demand-side shocks.
3 Measuring openness and gains from trade
The openness of the ith country (Grassman 1980) is usually computed as the ratio of
merchandise (M) exports and imports to GDP
Oi ¼ XMi þMMið Þ=GDPi ð2Þ
This definition is not suitable for measuring world openness because, by convention,
trade statistics include transportation and related costs in imports. Therefore, world
openness would appear to decrease (increase) if these costs decrease (increase) even
without any change in actual trade flows. Thus, following Maddison (1995), we
prefer to define world openness as the ratio of exports to GDP
OW ¼
X
XMi
.X
GDPi ð3Þ
which is roughly a half the standard measure for a country.1 We also compute the
ratio of exports to production of tradables only (or ‘openness tradables’) as
1 It would be exactly a half if trade is balanced, lower (higher) if the country ran a deficit (surplus) in its
trade balance. The bias from surpluses and deficits would disappear at world level, as they cancel each
other out.
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OM ¼
X
XMi
.X
VAMi: ð4Þ
The ratio aims to capture the impact of globalization on sectors that actually
competed on the world market (Feenstra 1998).
As discussed in more detail in Appendix A of Electronic Supplementary
Material, both measures of openness are biased. The numerator underestimates trade
because it omits services, and the numerator and denominator are inconsistent
because the former includes and the latter excludes intermediate products. Other,
more accurate, measures of openness can be computed with the available data only
after 1970 (Sect. 8) and even them, although closer to, fall short of the ‘ideal’ index.
We decompose changes in world openness (OW) as
DOW ¼
X
D aib
0
ijx
0
ij þ a0i D bijx0ij þ a0i b0ijDxij
 
ð5Þ
where ai is the share of the ith country in world GDP, bij is the share of the jth sector
in the GDP of the ith country, and xij is the ratio of exports to the VA of the jth
sector in the ith country. The first term of Eq. 5) measures the effects of changes in
the country distribution of world GDP (henceforth location effect), the second the
effects of changes in the composition of the GDP by polity (or structural change),
while the third (or residual) the changes in the export/GDP ratio by sector/country.
If the data by sector were detailed enough, the residual would capture the effect of
changes in trade costs on openness. Unfortunately, the historical data on the com-
position of GDP are not very detailed for most countries, and thus we have been
forced to distinguish between tradable and non-tradables, as proxied by services
(Appendix C.4 of Electronic Supplementary Material). Thus, the residual includes
the effects of changes in the composition of tradables, which would reinforce
(offset) the pure effect of trade costs if the growing sectors are more (less) open than
the rest of tradables.
In their seminal article, Arkolakis et al. (2012) define the (static) gains from trade
as the increase in income that would compensate the representative consumer from
a move to autarky. They show that gains for the ith country can be measured as
Gi ¼ 1 kiið Þ 1=e ð6Þ
where kii is the share of domestic expenditures and e is the (absolute value of the)
elasticity of trade to trade costs. Then country gains can be aggregated in a world-
wide index by weighting with shares on GDP (bi)
GW ¼
X
biGi ð7aÞ
or on population (vi)
or GW ¼
X
viGi: ð7bÞ
This estimate henceforth ‘baseline’) assumes a simple Armington framework,
with one good in multiple varieties (a domestic one plus as many imported ones as
trading partners), and thus one single trade elasticity e, no trade in intermediate
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goods, balanced trade and iceberg trade costs. These assumptions have been relaxed
in subsequent work. Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) put forward more
complex (and thus realistic) models, featuring (different combinations of) multiple
sectors, with or without free entry, trade in intermediate goods, multiple factors of
production and monopolistic competition without firm heterogeneity (a` la Krugman)
or with firm heterogeneity (a` la Melitz). All these models imply that the baseline
Arkolakis et al. (2012) statistics underestimate gains from trade. Costinot and
Rodriguez-Clare (2014) estimate that gains for a sample of 40 countries in 2008
were three times higher than the baseline for models with multiple sectors and up to
nine times higher for models with multiple sectors and trade in intermediated
goods.2 Ossa (2015) shows that using sector-specific trade-elasticities rather than a
single economy-wide parameter increases gains in a multiple-sector model from
16.9 to 55.6% (for all countries in 2007). Simonovska and Waugh (2014b) explore
the same issue from a different perspective. They estimate, with a price-based
method devised by Eaton and Kortum (2002), the elasticity e which would yield the
observed pattern of trade in 2004 with a baseline Armington model (comparable to
the Arkolakis et al. statistics) and with four alternative, more complex, models. All
these latter imply that the true trade elasticity were lower than the baseline one, and
gains correspondingly higher, up to 40%.3
On a different line, Felbermayr et al. (2015) argue that tariffs must be treated
differently from other trade costs, as revenues is redistributed back rather than
disappear. They suggest adjusting the baseline formula to
Gi ¼ 1 l ð1þdg=eÞi kiið Þ 1=e ð8Þ
where l, or the tariff multiplier, is defined as l = 1/(1 - T/E), T is the tariff
revenue and E the domestic expenditure, net of tariffs, while d and g measure
respectively the degree of oligopoly in the product market and firm heterogeneity a`
la Melitz. By construction, gains are bound to be higher than in the baseline and,
ceteris paribus, the difference is proportional to tariffs.4
2 The baseline formula and the equivalent model with one sector producing several varieties of the same
good yield an average of 4.4% of GDP. Gains are 15.3% of GDP for a model with multiple sectors, no
trade in intermediate goods and no free entry, 14% for a model with multiple sectors, no trade in
intermediate goods and free entry, 15% for a model with multiple sectors, no trade in intermediate goods
and two factors of production, perfectly mobile across sectors, 27% for a model with multiple sectors and
trade in intermediate goods, under perfect competition, 32% for the same model with monopolistic
competition without firm heterogeneity (a` la Krugman) and 40% for the same model with firm
heterogeneity (a` la Melitz).
3 They obtain e = 5.24 for the baseline Armington (and the monopolistic competition a` la Krugman),
4.17 for the extended baseline, 2.74 for the extended baseline with mark up and 3.7 for monopolistic
competition a` la Melitz (Table 7). The corresponding gains in 2007 for our sample of 37 countries (see
Sect. 6 for details) are 4.0, 5.1, 7.9 and 5.8%.
4 They estimate that gains for 11 countries in 2008 were about a quarter higher than with the Arkolakis
et al. (2012) statistics.
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4 The growth of world trade
Our trade database is organized by polity (independent country, colony or pre-
colonial corresponding native territory): for each polity, we estimate series of
imports and exports, at current and constant (1913) prices and at current and
constant (1913) borders.5 The data-base includes 11 polities from 1800,
accounting for 55% of world exports in 1850, 62 from 1823 (80% of world
exports in 1850) and 89 from 1830 (95%). After 1850, we have estimated trade for
around 130 polities i.e. all existing ones, with very few and quantitatively
negligible exceptions.
We obtain our series of world trade from 1850 to 1938 by summing up exports at
current prices, and we extend it to 1800 adjusting for changes in coverage the
sample before 1850 (Federico and Tena-Junguito 2016a) and to 2007 by linking it to
the current United Nations series (UN Statistical yearbook) in 1938. The resulting
series (Fig. 1) grew at an impressive annual rate of 4.22% (significant at 1%),
corresponding to a cumulated increase by 6437 times.6
The two World Wars and the outbreak of the Great Depression were clearly
major structural breaks, while Bai and Perron (2003) tests single out suggest
additional structural breaks in 1817 and 1865 in the period 1800 1913 and, less
clearly, in 1970 or 1980 for 1950 2007. Table 1 reports the rates of change for the
resulting eight periods, as well as for three longer ones.
World exports started to grow fast after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The
early rise reflects also the return to normal trading conditions after the shock of
the Wars, but this effect accounted for less than 7% of the increase of trade until
1865 and for less than 2% of overall growth before World War One.7 Contrary to
conventional wisdom, trade grew faster in 1817 1866 than in 1867 1913 and the
difference is significant at 1%. If trade had continued to grow as fast as before
1867, in 1913 it would have been 55% higher. The outbreak of World War One
caused world exports to fall by about a quarter, as much as estimated by Glick
and Taylor (2010) with a different method. World trade returned to its pre-war
level in 1924 and continued to grow until 1929. The Great Depression caused
trade to collapse: in 1913 it was below its pre-war level and the following
recovery was only partial. In contrast, world trade recovered quite quickly after
World War Two. By 1950 it was already 10% higher than in 1929 and grew at
5 Whenever available, we use modern estimates of trade or national accounts. Otherwise, we collect data
on imports and exports at current prices from original sources, filling the gaps with interpolations or
extrapolations based on trends in nearby polities or those with similar factor endowments. We then deflate
these series with country specific price indexes, mostly based on London prices, adjusted for freights.
Finally, we convert all data to current or 1913 dollars (for details see Federico and Tena Junguito 2016a).
6 Whenever possible (i.e. if the number of the observations exceeds 25 30), we compute the rate of
change of the ith series as w = b/w, where b and w are coefficients from a regression (Razzaque et al.
2007) D Ln Wt = a ? b TIME ? w lnWt 1 ? u ln D Ln Wt 1 ? u. Otherwise we use a log linear
specification. In both cases, we test null hypotheses about rates (equal to zero or equal to rates in other
periods) with a standard Wald restriction. We compute the cumulated change as Total = [exp(w)*n] 1.
7 O’Rourke (2006) reckons that in 1815 exports were equal to the pre war level in Sweden, one third
lower in the United Kingdom and in the United States and half in France. If exports of all other polities
declined as much as the French ones, world trade would have been 40% lower than in 1792.
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breakneck speed during the golden age, returning close to its pre-1913 growth
path (Fig. 1). Growth in trade slowed markedly in the 1970s but accelerated again
from 1980 onwards. From 1995 to 2007, the level of trade exceeded the pre-war
growth path, but it converged back to it during the Great Recession.
Part of the long-run increase in trade reflects the growing political fragmentation.
We estimate that, without the creation of new states after World War One in Europe
and the Middle East, in 1924 world exports would have been 2.9% lower (and
1800 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1920 1940 1960 1980 2000
World export constant log
Forecast 1817 1913
Forecast (1993 2007)
Fig. 1 World Export at constant prices, (1913$) Log scale 1800 2010. Sources: 1830 1938: Federico
and Tena Junguito (2016a) and 1950 2010 Appendix D (online)
Table 1 Rates of growth of
world trade, 1800 2010. Source:
Federico and Tena Junguito
(2016a)
* Significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%;
*** significant at 1%;
§ log linear estimate
Yearly rates Total cumulated change (%)
1800 1817§ 0.49 8.7
1817 1865 3.97*** 598.6
1866 1913 3.07*** 310.1
1919 1929§ 5.37*** 71.0
1929 1938§ 0.83 7.2
1950 1973 8.08*** 541.3
1973 1980 3.96*** 32.0
1980 2007 5.86*** 386.9
1817 1913 3.62** 3215.9
1919 1938§ 1.48 32.5
1950 2007 5.10*** 1823.6
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European exports 6.3% lower).8 The gap has been shrinking during the interwar
years so that the series at current borders underestimated the growth of trade
relative to the estimate at constant 1913 borders.9 Lavalle´e and Vicard (2013,
Table 4) estimate that further border changes (the partition of British India in 1946
and of British and French African colonies in the 1950s and 1960s and the
fragmentation of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia in the 1990s) accounted for 6.6%
of the growth of trade during the Golden Age and for about a sixth of the overall rise
from 1950 to 2007. This is equivalent to a third of a percentage point of the growth
rate i.e. to about a fifth of the difference between the two globalizations.
In the long run, exports of all polities increased, but not to the same extent. For
instance, the United Kingdom was by far the largest exporter in 1850 (19% of total at
current prices) and still in 1913 (13.7 vs. 12.9% for Germany and 12.8% for the United
States), but only the 10th largest in 2007 (3.2%). China was the 11th largest in 1850
(2.3% of world exports), slid to 17th place in 1913 (1.6%), and rose to second place in
2007 (8.9%, behind Germanywith 9.6%).Most of these changes took place during the
second globalization: the simple coefficient of correlation between shares by polity are
higher between 1850 and 1913 and between 1913 and 1972 (0.91 and 0.87) than
between 1972 and 2007 (0.84). A simple division of countries by continent and by
level of development highlights the main patterns (Fig. 2).10
In the early 1830s, Europe accounted for 62% of world exports and the advanced
countries for about a half. This latter share increased by ten points in the 1850s and then
remained around 60%until 1913, while the share of Europe drifted slightly downwards to
56%.The twoWorldWars and theGreatDepression caused substantial changes in shares,
which were however largely reversed during the Golden Age. In 1972 Europe still
accounted for 52% of world exports and the ‘old rich’ for 57%. In contrast, the changes
after 1972 have been large and (so far) permanent. The share of Asia rose from about a
sixth to a third, at the expenseof all other continents.Europe’s share slid fromover ahalf to
about 45%, and thus it faredbetter than theAmericas (a fall fromaquarter to slightly above
one-sixth), Africa and Oceania. Until the early 1990, the fall in the share of ‘advanced
countries’, from 56% to about 40% of world exports, was compensated by the relative
increase of exports from the ‘other OECD’ countries most notably Japan. In the last
fifteen years, exports from the ‘advanced countries’ decreased further to slightly over a
third, the ‘other OECD’ countries returned to a sixth, their level of the 1970s, and the ‘rest
of Asia’ i.e. mostly China- jumped to a quarter of the world market.
8 The changes in boundaries before 1913 reduced trade, but the effect was minimal at most 0.57% in
1860, on the eve of Italian unification. We treat the German Zollverein before 1870 as a single polity.
9 From 1924 to 1938 trade at constant prices increased by 9.7% if measured at current borders but by
11.1% if estimated at 1913 borders. European exports would have been 2.9% lower than actual ones
without boundary changes.
10 The group of ‘rich’ (or ‘advanced’) countries includes all countries whose GDP per capita exceeded
half the British one in 1870 i.e. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands,
New Zealand, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States. The ‘other OECD’ countries are
Austria, Greece, Finland, Ireland, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Some
Asian and African polities are missing before 1850, and thus the shares of these two continents (and of
poor countries) are correspondingly undervalued. However, the bias is very small (the coefficient of
correlation between polity shares for the 1830 and the full sample in 1850 is 0.96) and it is a price worth
paying to be able to extend the series back to 1830.
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10
export/GDP ratio being 22.5 vs. 12.5%) and individually (there were only nine
exceptions, the most notable ones being India and the United Kingdom). They
accounted for 90.4% of world trade in 1913 and for 81.3% in 2007, but the world
would have been more open in 2007 than in 1913 even if the remaining polities had
exported nothing. This hypothesis is clearly absurd: in reality, in 2007 the export/
GDP ratio for the rest of the world was 30.9%.
We prefer not to compute aggregate export/GDP ratio with all available polity
series, as changes in coverage could introduce spurious movements in the resulting
series. Instead, we have selected two different time-invariant samples, featuring 18
polities from 1830 (‘1830 sample’) and 29 from 1870 (‘1870 sample’). In spite of
the small number of polities, these samples are quite representative: the ‘1830
sample’ accounted for 58.3% of world trade in 1850 and the ‘1870 sample’ for
79.6% in 1913, for 73.5% in 1973 and for 53.8% in 2007. Furthermore, it can be
shown that the ‘1870 sample’ captures quite well the world-wide trends after 1973:
the coefficient of correlation with the export/GDP ratio for all countries in
1973 2007 is 0.982 and the rates of change are almost identical (Statistical
Appendix S.2 of Electronic Supplementary Material).
A visual inspection of the series (Fig. 3), supported by a statistical analysis of
rates of change (see Statistical Appendix S2 of Electronic Supplementary Material),
highlight two major waves of globalization separated by a century of fluctuations.11
i. From1830 to 1870 the export/GDP ratio for the ‘1830 sample’ doubled, from6
to 12% i.e. it grew significantly faster than openness for the same countries
during the second globalization and as fast as openness for all countries. If
anything, the results underestimate the growth in openness. In fact, the trade
per capita of the omitted polities tripled from 1830 to 1870 but very few among
them experienced significant growth in GDP per capita.12 The same reasoning
implies that openness had been growing before 1830. This hypothesis is
confirmed by the few series available, with the conspicuous exception of the
United States.13
ii. The export/GDP ratio for the ‘1870 sample’ fluctuated with no trend for most of
the period from 1870 to World War One, rose in the early 1910s to a peak of
almost 14%, fell during the war, remained low in the 1920s, collapsed to a
minimum of 6.7% in 1936 and recovered only partially during the Golden Age.
Openness in the early 1970s was similar to the level of the late 1920s and about
11 Data for 1939 1950 are not available and we prefer to omit from Fig. 3 the war years 1914 1920
because some GDP series at current prices are missing and the figures for belligerent countries are inflated
by the inclusion of war related expenditures.
12 The increase in export/GDP of the remaining polities would have matched the rise in openness of the
sample if their rate of growth of GDP per capita had exceeded 0.9% yearly. This condition was met only
by a quarter of the omitted polities from the Maddison (2010) database, and all of them except Germany
were very small.
13 Openness can be computed from 1820 to 1830 for ten polities the United States, five Latin American
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Cuba) and four European ones (France, Denmark,
Netherlands and Sweden). The aggregate ratio remained constant around 6%, dragged down by the
decline in the American ratio from 7% in 1818 to 5.3% in 1830, but the unweighted average increased
from 9.4 to 12.7% and the median from 6.8 to 7.8%.
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two points lower than a century before. It is possible that the ratio in the rest of
the world was marginally higher in 1973 than in 1870, as before 1913 their
exports increased a little more and GDP grew much less than those of the 29
countries. Thus, for instance, the export/GDP ratio for China soared from less
than 0.5% in the 1830s to around 1.2% in the early 1870s and doubled again on
the eve of World War One. However, this would not change the main
conclusion. The fast rise of trade before World War One matched or barely
exceeded the growth of GDP, and its post-1950 boom healed the wounds of the
Great Depression and of the two World Wars.
iii. Openness rose very fast from the early 1970s to 2007, doubling (from 9.9 to
19.2%) for the ‘1870 sample’ and increasing by 2.5 times (from 9.6 to
23.7%) for all countries. As discussed in more detail in Sect. 8, the ratios
soared during the oil crises, up to 17% in 1980, stagnated for about fifteen
years and resumed their growth after 1995.
The worldwide aggregates conceal wide differences among polities. As expected, the
level of openness is negatively related to the size of the country. A simple log log
regression of export/GDP ratio with population yields coefficients of-0.16 in 1913 and
-0.21 in 2007, both significant at 5%. Interestingly, dummies for continents and
landlocked countries are not significant. However, the dispersion of country ratios did not
change in the long run and most polities shared the worldwide growth in openness during
the two waves of globalization. In 1830 1870, the export/GDP ratio increased in 15
polities out of 18 of the 1830 sample, stagnated in the United States and declined only in
two tropical exporters,Brazil and Jamaica.Since1972, opennesshasgrown in90countries
out of 124, with a median increase of one half. Openness has decreased only in very small
countries (thebiggest beingCuba) and this decline has beenmore thancompensatedby the
leap forward of the former Soviet Union (from 3 to 30%) and of China (from 2.5 to 35%).
In contrast, from 1870 to 1970, polity specificmovements diverged from aggregate trends
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990
1830 sample (18 polies)
1870 sample (29 polies)
UN (all countries)
Fig. 3 World openness at current prices, 1830 2007. Sources: Exports of goods: Federico and Tena
Junguito (2016a) and Appendix D (online); GDP: Appendix C (online)
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in more than a third of cases. Somewhat surprisingly, ten polities, including Australia,
Canada and the United Kingdom were more open in 1950 than in 1913.
The impact of the second globalization is even more evident if we focus on the
openness tradables (Fig. 4). We can compute this measure for eight countries, six
Europeans, including Great Britain and France, plus Australia and Peru, from 1830
(‘1830 tradable sample’) and for sixteen, including all the advanced countries, Japan
and India, after 1870 (‘1870 tradable sample’).
By construction, openness tradables must be higher than openness, but the
striking fact is the widening of the gap during the second globalization. In the
nineteenth century, the ratio was slightly above 1.5 for both the ‘1830 tradable
sample’, and the ‘1870 tradable sample’. It rose to 1.90 in 1913, continued to climb
to 2.40, declined somewhat during the Great Depression, recovered up to 2.5 in the
early 1970s and jumped to 3.5 times in 2007. The ratio between the two measures
for all countries increased even faster, from 1.5 in 1970 to 2.6 in 2007. Thus,
arguably, the growth in the aggregate export/GDP ratio since 1973, however
impressive, undervalues the differences between the two globalizations.
6 The proximate causes of changes in openness
The decomposition of the increase in openness from 1830 to 1870 according to
Eq. 5) shows zero location effect and a modest negative impact of changes in
location, which reduced openness by 0.3 points. Thus, the first globalization is
explained exclusively by the residual i.e. by the fall in trade costs. This conclusion
is plausible, but unfortunately, the ‘1830 tradable sample’ is hardly representative. It
accounted for only 40% of world exports in 1850 and, above all it does not include
the United States, which in those years jumped from a sixth to a third of the GDP of
the ‘1830 sample’. We explore the effect of this massive change in location of GDP
by decomposing the growth in openness for the ‘1830 sample’ into the location
effect and the residual. As expected, the relative rise of the United States reduced
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990
sample 1830 (8 countries) sample 1870 (16 countries)
all countries
Fig. 4 World Openness tradables at current prices 1830 2007. Sources: Export goods: Federico and
Tena Junguito (2016a) and Appendix D (online); GDP tradables: Appendix C (online)
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openness by 0.4 points but it was compensated by other changes in the distribution
of GDP. Thus, the total location effect was positive, accounting for about a tenth of
the total rise in openness for the ‘1830 sample’. All the rest is explained by the
residual, which includes the structural change in all likelihood quite modest.
Representativeness is much less an issue for the ‘1870 tradables sample’, as its
sixteen countries accounted for 67.6% of world exports in 1913 and for 47.2% in
2007. We report the result of the decomposition in Table 2, adjusting the signs of
percentage changes so that a positive (negative) sign corresponds to an increase
(decrease) in openness.
In the whole period, changes in the distribution by country (location effect) and
in the composition of GDP (structural change) reduced potential growth by 1.3 and
5.3 points, respectively. Structural change reduced openness in all periods but
1932 1950 but the effect is especially large from 1973 onwards, when tradables
decreased from 40 to 27% of the total GDP of these sixteen polities. In contrast,
most of the negative location effect is found before 1950. The column ‘location
USA’ shows that it is mostly accounted for by the rise of the United States from
28% of the GDP of the sample in 1870 to 39% in 1913 and then to 65% after the war
Since 1950, the share of the United States has been declining, and the location
effect has turned positive.
In spite of the negative contributions from structural change and location, the
export/GDP ratios increased by about seven points thanks to the residual. In theory,
this latter might reflect the positive effect on trade of the convergence in income
Table 2 Decomposition of change in openness, 1870 tradable sample. Source: see text
Openness Causes of change in openness
Structural
change
Location effect Residual
Initial Change USA Other Total
1870 1913 11.11 2.16 0.96 1.02 0.15 0.88 4.09
% 42.5 46.2 6.9 39.3 181.9
1913 1929 13.36 3.09 1.72 1.29 0.28 1.13 0.25
% 55.6 43.9 5.3 36.4 8.0
1929 1932 10.26 6.97 0.01 0.31 0.18 0.49 7.45
% 0.1 2.7 4.3 7.0 108.0
1932 1950 6.38 0.84 0.98 1.27 0.01 1.26 1.12
% 116.3 150.2 0.9 149.3 133.0
1913 1950 13.36 6.13 0.10 3.06 0.19 2.86 3.37
% 1.7 47.9 3.3 46.7 55.0
1950 1972 7.23 2.49 1.46 1.98 0.13 1.84 2.11
% 58.7 79.4 5.4 74.0 84.7
1972 2007 9.72 8.40 2.82 0.74 0.15 0.59 10.64
% 33.7 8.9 1.8 7.1 126.6
1870 2007 11.11 7.01 5.26 1.06 0.16 1.23 13.50
% 75.0 15.2 2.3 17.5 192.5
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levels among polities of the sample, but this does not seem the case.14 In contrast
changes in the residual tally well with the evidence on movements in trade costs.
The fast increase in openness in 1830 1870 and 1972 2007 coincides with a period
of intensive trade liberalization, and its collapse in 1929 1932 with the protectionist
backlash during the Great Depression. The modest rise in 1950 1972 could be
explained by the first stage of the post-war liberalization, while the increase
1870 1913 is likely to reflect a decline in transportation costs, as barriers to trade
did not differ much between those years.15
7 Gains from trade
The key parameter for the estimate of gains by Arkolakis et al. (2012) is the trade
elasticity e. Head and Mayer (2014, Table 5) survey 32 econometric estimates,
which yield an average of 5.13 and a median of 3.78. A range around 4 is confirmed
by the recent estimates, with different methods, by Simonovska and Waugh (2014a),
Ossa (2015) and Caliendo and Parro (2015). We thus assume e = 3.78 and,
following the standard practice, we proxy k (the share of expenditure in domestic
goods) with the difference between GDP and imports at current prices.
Consistently with the levels of openness, gains (Table 3) were greater in 2007
than in 1913 both on average and for most polities.
The difference is huge for China or Russia, which opened world trade during the
second globalization. In contrast, gains were lower in 2007 than in 1913 in exporters
of primary products turned inwards, such as Argentina, Brazil and Cuba in Latin
America and some Western offshoots.
We obtain a yearly series of world gains for the ‘1830 sample’ and the ‘1870
sample’ by weighting the polity series with their shares on total GDP at current
prices (Fig. 5). The coefficients of correlation between the three series are very
high 0.979 between the ‘1830’ and ‘1870 sample’, and 0.935 and 0.982
respectively with the ‘all country’ series gains, available from 1972. Not
surprisingly given the formulas, gains and openness are strictly correlated a
coefficient of 0.91 for the 1870 sample.16 It would thus be redundant to describe in
any detail the trends. We will just add that a back-of-the-envelope estimate for all
countries suggests a five-point increase in gains, from 2.8% in 1972 to 7.8% in
2007, slightly higher than the comparable estimate for the ‘1870 sample’.17
14 The long run r convergence among the 29 polities of the sample appears modest (the coefficient of
variation declining from over 0.50 in the 1890s to about 0.35 0.4) and it concentrates in the Golden Age
when openness was not growing much.
15 The nominal protection for 23 countries, weighted with trade, was 11.5% in 1870 and 10.2% in 1913
(data from Federico and Vasta 2015; Federico and Tena Junguito 2016a).
16 The two series would diverge only if GDP M and X/GDP have different trends, and this is possible
only in the exceptional cases of very open countries with highly unbalanced trade.
17 We obtain these figures by aggregating all countries in one single ‘world’ rather than weighting
country specific estimates according to their GDP. The comparable estimates for the ‘1870 sample’ are
2.9 and 6.5%.
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Table 3 Gains from trade,
1913 and 2007. Sources: see text
Arkolakis Felbermayr
Baseline Extended
1913 2007 1913 2007 1913 2007
Argentina 7.5 4.8 12.5 7.1 13.3 7.5
Australia 5.5 4.8 8.9 5.2 9.4 5.3
Belgium 11.1 55.8 11.9 57.8 12.0 58.1
Bulgaria 3.1 28.0
Brazil 4.8 2.5 10.4 3.0 11.3 3.1
Canada 7.0 7.9 10.8 8.8 11.5 9.0
Chile 5.4 8.1 9.0 9.8 9.6 10.0
China 1.0 7.5
Colombia 3.2 6.1 8.5 8.3 9.3 8.7
Cuba 7.5 5.3
Denmark 10.3 9.5 11.7 10.8 11.9 11.0
Egypt 7.2 5.9 10.1 7.2 10.6 7.4
Finland 10.1 10.1
France 4.9 7.1 6.4 8.2 6.6 8.4
French Indochina 3.8 14.3
Germany 5.9 9.6 7.1 10.9 7.3 11.2
Greece 6.0 7.6
India 2.3 5.6 2.7 7.5 2.8 7.8
Italy 4.2 7.0 5.6 8.0 5.8 8.2
Korea 3.0 10.4
Japan 4.4 4.3 5.6 4.2 5.8 4.2
New Zealand 8.7 6.8 12.5 7.7 13.2 7.8
Norway 8.4 21.2
Netherlands 35.3 23.1 35.8 25.2 35.9 25.6
Peru 2.5 5.2
Portugal 2.0 10.9 3.6 10.9 3.9 10.9
Russia/USSR 1.8 7.5 3.6 3.8
South Africa 8.0 9.6 10.7 10.7 11.2 10.9
Spain 3.2 8.0 4.5 9.1 4.7 9.3
Sweden 6.2 10.1 7.6 10.1 7.9 10.1
Switzerland 12.8 11.1 14.3 11.2 14.6 11.2
Taiwan 7.3 19.1
United Kingdom 8.3 6.3 9.6 7.2 9.8 7.4
United States 1.4 3.9 2.3 4.1 2.4 4.1
Uruguay 4.4 7.2 9.1 8.3 9.9 8.6
Venezuela 2.8 5.7
Average 6.3 11.5 9.2 12.3 9.6 12.5
Median 5.4 7.9 8.9 8.9 9.5 9.1
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Before 1870, globalization benefitted mostly the rich countries (as defined in Sect. 4).
In 1830, the GDP-weighted gains were around 2.3 points for both rich and poor countries,
but by 1870 gains had risen to about 4.5% of GDP for the former and to about 3% for the
latter. From1870 to 1913, the gains for the rich countries fluctuated around 4.5 5%,while
thoseof the rest of theworld, inclusiveof India and Japan, almost doubled.Yet, in 1913 the
GDP-weighted averagewas still a point higher for the rich countries than for the rest of the
world (5.2 vs. 4.3%).TheGreatDepressionhit bothgroupsbadly, reducing the gains to the
level of the 1830s. Trends diverged somewhat afterwards. The gains for the advanced
countries remained rather low in the 1950s and increased very slowly during the Golden
Age, so that by 1973 theywere still lower than in 1913 by a third. In contrast, gains for the
rest of the world recovered in the late 1930s and during the war, but declined in the 1950s
and 1960s. While the second globalization benefitted both groups, the rich were
marginally better off. Their gains increased by 2.5 times, to 8.1% of GDP, while those of
the rest of the world only doubled, to 6.2%.
Our estimates might seem low relative to the hype surrounding globalization. To
what extent can the treatment of tariffs as ‘normal’ trade costs, the assumption of
constant trade elasticity and the use of the simplest model explain them?
i. Estimates with the Felbermayr et al. (2015) formula (Table 3, columns
‘Felbermayr baseline’) always exceed the baseline gains, but the gap is
substantially larger in 1913 (about two-thirds) than in 2007 (about a seventh).18
The decline is confirmed by the yearly series of tariff-adjusted gainswhich can be
estimated for a small number of advanced countries: the ratio to the baseline
estimate remains around 1.30 1.40 for most of the period, with a spike over 1.70
2.0
3.0
4.0
5.0
6.0
7.0
8.0
1830 1850 1870 1890 1910 1930 1950 1970 1990
1830 sample (18 polies) 1870 sample (29 polies)
UN (all countries)
Fig. 5 Gains from trade 1830 2007 as percentage of GDP. Sources: See text Sect. 3
18 We use the data on tariff revenue in 1913 from the data base underlying Federico and Vasta (2015),
while for the 2000s we get data from Kee et al. (2009), referring to 2002 (figures in italic) and from the
WDI (http://data.worldbank.org accessed Nov 2015), referring to 2007. We compute yearly series of
nominal protection for 14 countries in 1870 1974, 11 in 1975 1987 and 8 in 1988 1993 with data on
custom revenues from Mitchell (2010, Table G.6).
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in the 1930s, but it declines from the 1970s to about 1.10. This trend reflects the
liberalization of trade and possibly the increasing use of quantitative restrictions
rather than duties as a tool for protection.
ii. Our estimate would bias gains upwards (downwards) if the true elasticity were
higher (lower) than 3.78. For instance, with e = 5, as assumed byConstinot and
Rodriguez-Clare (2014) andFelbermayr et al. (2015), or e = 8, as hypothesized
by Jacks et al. (2011) in their baseline estimation, average gains over the whole
period1870 2007 for the ‘1870 sample’would be reduced from4.11 to 3.08 and
1.91%, respectively. For instance, had it increased linearly from 3.78 in 1870 to
7 in 2007, gains would have remained stable around 3.5% of GDP (but only
1.6% in the 1930s). Such a massive change in trade elasticity is implausible.
Indeed Hugot (2014) estimates, with two different versions of a gravity model,
that the elasticity of French trade from 1829 to 1913 fluctuated in the short run
without any clear trend. Furthermore, his median estimates (4.84 and 4.93) are
not statistically different from 3.78. Waiting for further actual work, one might
start by discussing the origin of possible changes. Even assuming no change in
product specific trade elasticities, the aggregate e would have changed if
elasticities differed by product, given the well-known changes in the
composition of world trade. Caliendo and Parro (2015) estimate that in 1993
elasticitieswere higher for agricultural goods (8.11) andmineral products (15.7)
than for manufactures. In this case, the growth of intra-industry trade in
manufactures after World War Two would have decreased elasticity and thus,
ceteris paribus, increased gains from trade. In contrast, Ossa (2015) finds no
systematic differences in elasticities for primary products and manufactures in
2007 (the unweighted averages being 3.54 and 3.62).
iii. The shortage of data make it very difficult to estimate any of the models put
forward by Costinot and Rodrigues-Clare (2014). We can only replicate the
adjustment for monopolistic competition by Felbermayr et al. (2015). The
gains (Table 3, column ‘Felbermayr extended’) are a bit larger than the
baseline but the difference is modest. However, this by no means implies
that the difference would be modest if it were possible to estimate a model
with multiple sectors and monopolistic competition and possibly sector-
specific elasticities. It is likely that the gap was larger in 2007 than in 1913,
as monopolistic competition and trade in intermediate products are much
more relevant now than on the eve of World War One.
8 Robustness checks
In this section, we deal with the robustness of results to alternative GDP data,
country weighting schemes and formulas for openness
We compute two alternative series of openness to check the robustness of our
baseline estimates. First, we get a series at constant prices by converting our export
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series in 1990 PPP dollars and dividing the result by total GDP.19 The full samples
includes up to 51 polities, but we prefer to focus on the polities of the ‘1830’ and
‘1870 samples’ for a direct comparison with trends at current prices (Fig. 6)
As a rule, openness grew systematically more, and declined less in the interwar
years, at constant prices than at current prices (Appendix Table S.2 of Electronic
Supplementary Material). The difference is statistically significant before 1870, in the
interwar years and after 1973. This implies that the prices of exports declined relative to
(a) Federico-Tena 1830 sample at current and constant prices
(b) Federico-Tena 1870 samples at current and constant prices
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0.000
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0.100
0.150
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0.250
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Fig. 6 World openness 1830 2007, Current and constant prices. a 1830 sample (18 polities). b 1870
sample (29 polities). Sources: Exports of goods: Federico and Tena Junguito (2016a) and Appendix D
(online); GDP: Appendix C (online)
19 We compute exports at time t for the ith polity as XGKt X$1990  GDPGK1990=GDP$1990
   XRt=XR1990
 
,
where the superscript R refers to local currency at constant prices, GK to Geary Khamis dollars and $ to
dollars at market exchange rate. Cf. Appendix C for sources of GDP data.
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the prices of imports and/or prices of tradable goods. Relative prices of imports might
increase because of protection, while prices of non tradable would rise if productivity
grew less (the Baumol effect, more likely in advanced countries) and/or domestic prices
in less developed countries converged towards ‘world’ (i.e. American) levels (see
Appendix B of Electronic Supplementary Material). There is a considerable exception
to this rule. From 1972 to 1980, openness for the ‘1870 sample’ soared from 10 to
15.2% if measured at current prices, and grew only from 9.6 to 11% if measured at
constant prices. The ratio between the two measures of openness increased from 1.05 to
1.38, to return to 1.04 in 1986. This movement is surely related to the twin oil shock,
but it is not exclusively determined by prices of oil. In fact, the ‘1870 sample’ only
features one oil exporting country, Venezuela, which experienced a 6.5 increase in the
ratio of openness at current to constant prices. Yet the increase was even larger in
Turkey (by 7.6 times) while it was zero or negligible in Austria, Switzerland and India.
As a first approximation, the size of the shock and its duration seem inversely related to
GDP per capita i.e. the advanced countries with diversified exports had smaller and
shorter cycles than exporters of primary producers.
Second, we compute export/GDP ratios at current prices using as the denominator
the synthetic estimates by Klasing and Millionis (2014). We have computed 45 of these
‘hybrid’ openness series, but as before we prefer to limit the comparison to 27 of them,
all the polities of the ‘1870 sample’, but Cuba and Peru (Fig. 7).
These ‘Klasing and Millionis’ series grows faster than our baseline series before
1913, and decline less in interwar years, although only the former difference is
statistically significant.20 Thus, the Klasing and Millionis (2014) method
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Federico-Tena Klasing-Millionis (27 polies)
Fig. 7 World openness, current prices 1870 1938, Federico and Tena Junguito and Klasing Millionis
estimates. Sources: The same Fig. 6 and Klasing and Millionis (2014) Statistical Appendix Table S.2
20 Cf. Statistical Appendix Table S.2. Between 1870 1872 and 1911 1913, the Klasing and Millionis
(2014) GDP series increase less than the polity specific ones in 22 countries out of 25. The three
exceptions are Argentina, Belgium, where the difference is minimal, and the Ottoman Empire, which
during the period lost all of its Balkan provinces.
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systematically underestimates the growth in GDP relative to the national accounts,
in all likelihood because the method assumes no convergence of prices towards the
‘world’ level (cf. Appendix B of Electronic Supplementary Material).
It can be argued that weighting polities with their total GDP is unfair because it
values more the welfare of individuals from wealthy countries. Indeed, re-weighting
openness and gains of trade with population (from Federico and Tena-Junguito
2016b and United Nations 2011) highlights some sizeable differences before 1913
and during the Golden Age (Fig. 8).
(a) Openness
(b) Gains from trade
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Fig. 8 Alternative estimates, World Openness 1870 sample: population weighting. a Trade openness.
b Gains from trade. Sources: a see sources Fig. 6b; population from Federico and Tena Junguito (2016b)
and United Nations (2011). b See sources Fig. 5; population from Federico and Tena Junguito (2016b)
and United Nations (2011)
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The population-weighted series of gains from trade increased before 1913 and
declined during the Golden Age, instead of remaining roughly constant in both
periods. In spite of the growth after 1973, by 2007 it was still 4.2 points below the
GDP weighted series and only 1.5 above its level in 1913. The difference between
the two series depends on India, which accounted for about half of the population of
the 1870 sample but for less than 5% of its total GDP.
Last but not least, one could rise some more fundamental objections to our
measures of openness. One could find the argument for the use of exports than total
trade in the numerator, although correct at a worldwide level, not appropriate for
small samples. Furthermore, the export/GDP ratio may differ from ‘true’ openness,
as discussed in Sect. 3 and Appendix A of Electronic Supplementary Material. We
tackle the first objection by re-computing openness according to the standard
definition, for the ‘1870 sample’ (Statistical Appendix Table S.2 of Electronic
Supplementary Material). The differences are negligible for the worldwide series
(the coefficient of correlation of 0.996) but also very small for individual polities
(the average coefficient of correlation is 0.939 with a minimum of 0.83 for India).
We can explore the potential biases in the export/GDP ratio after 1973, thanks to
data on trade in services for all countries from the United Nations and on gross
output of agriculture and manufacturing for 15 OECD countries (see Appendix C of
Electronic Supplementary Material). Adding trade in services to the numerator
(Eq. A.8 c) increases the rate of growth in openness for all countries by half a point,
from 1.49 to 1.90%, while also adding gross output in the denominator (Eq. A8.f)
raises the rate of growth in openness for the 15 countries from 1.19 to 1.79%. Both
differences are significant i.e. our baseline definition of openness (Eq. 4)
undervalues its growth during the second globalization. The bias also affects the
estimates of gains. Computing domestic flows kii as the difference between GDP
and imports of goods and services (rather than goods only) for all countries
increases gains by 0.3 points of GDP in 1980 and by 1.8 in 2007. Computing these
flows as the difference between gross output and total imports (including services)
raises the gains from trade for 15 advanced countries by 0.5 points (i.e. by a sixth) in
the early 1970s and by 6.3 (i.e. by over two-thirds) at the end of the period.
Unfortunately, it is impossible to replicate these computations for the first
globalization. The quantitative evidence on gross output/VA ratios is limited to
agriculture (Federico 2004) and to the energy intensity of GDP (Kander et al. 2013).
There is abundant anecdotal evidence on the international trade in services before
1913 and it is safe to assume that was much less developed than nowadays. It was
limited to banking and shipping services, and the United Kingdom was the main
world supplier of both. On average the United Kingdom’s exports of services
accounted for a quarter of her merchandise exports in 1870 1913 (Mitchell 1988,
p. 871), equaling 3.9% of world trade. In contrast, export of services were
equivalent to almost a fifth of trade in goods in 2004 2007. Thus, in all likelihood,
our comparison based on trade in goods only underestimates the difference between
the two globalizations.
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9 Conclusions
We can sum up our results in a single sentence: the conventional periodization of
the two waves of globalization has to be revised and the differences between them
were substantial. The first globalization pre-dated 1870, while the period 1870 1913
can be more accurately described, at least for the major countries, as the first stage
of a century long era of fluctuations in the degree of globalization. Both openness
and gains from trade remained broadly constant until World War One, fell
dramatically during the Great Depression and recovered in the 1950s and 1960s. At
the time of the first oil crisis, the world was not significantly more open than a
century before and the overall gains from trade were significantly lower.
The following thirty years featured a massive transformation, which differed
from the first globalization in four ways:
i. the distribution of world trade by country changed more and faster than in
any other comparable period, thanks to the rise of China and other Asian
countries;
ii. in spite of a substantial number of exceptions at a country level, world
openness was substantially higher in 2007 than in 1913, and the measured
gap is likely to underestimate the true one due to the omission of trade in
services;
iii. gains from trade in 2007 were larger than in 1913 by about two-thirds,
according to the baseline Arkolakis et al. (2012) statistics or by about a sixth
with the adjustment for returned tariff revenue (Felbermayr et al. 2015).
Both measures clearly underestimate the gains and, on balance, it seems
more likely that the gap with the ‘true’ (and unmeasurable) gains was larger
in 2007 than in 1913;
iv. the second globalization benefitted slightly more the advanced countries,
while before 1913 gains had been substantially larger for the poor countries
Our analysis of the proximate causes of changes in openness points to a major
role of the residual, and thus in all likelihood to movements in trade costs. They
accounted for all the growth in openness in 1870 1913 and 1973 2007 and,
possibly also in 1830 1870, and for the collapse of the interwar years. There are,
however, differences in the impact of changes in composition and world distribution
of GDP. The rise of the United States dragged down the growth of openness before
1950, while the growth of services reduced it in the second globalization.
The last point relates to the current debate on the future of world trade. The
growth in openness for tradables since 1970 is too fast to be explained only by the
fall in transportation costs and/or fall in barriers to trade for an invariant bundle of
consumption goods. It must reflect also the growing exchange of varieties of the
same consumer goods and, above all, the development of international supply
chains (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzales 2013). It is still debated whether these
processes have peaked or not (Boz et al. 2015; Constantinescu et al. 2015;
Hoeckman 2015; Timmer et al. 2016), and consequently whether the level of
openness of the late 2000s will prove to be a historical peak as was the 1913 one, as
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suggested by the Economist already two years ago (A troubling trajectory Dec 13th
2014). We will not speculate further on this. Suffice to say that, in spite of the likely
similarities in its causes, so far the second globalization has been deeper and farther
reaching than the first.
Acknowledgements Funding was provided by European Research Council Advanced Research Grant
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